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uring the current round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations on 
agricultural trade, significant attention has been focused on state trading 
enterprises (STEs). Concern has been expressed, especially by the United States, but 
also by the European Union that these enterprises may engage in practices that are not 
disciplined by the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. State trading in grain is 
a particularly contentious issue. The attention has been focused to date on the 
Canadian Wheat Board and the Australian Wheat Board, but these are not the only 
instances where the state is extensively involved in the grain trade. The U.S. 
Commodity Credit Corporation was initially notified to the WTO as a state trading 
enterprise in 1995, but when the United States stopped using the Export Enhancement 
Program it withdrew the notification.
1 Although the grains trade in the EU involves a 
great deal of government intervention, the EU has not provided notification to the 
WTO of any of its agencies involved in the process of exporting cereals.  
The issue of state trading is nonetheless central to the European position in 
agricultural trade negotiations. The EU’s proposal on export competition advocates a 
comprehensive approach that addresses both direct export subsidies and such potential 
indirect subsidies as subsidized export credits, abuse of food aid, and state trading 
enterprises. They argue “exclusive rights and privileges” confer to STEs considerable 
market power, which can result in unfair competition against other world market 
traders.
2 Although the EU is silent about state involvement in European export 
practices, students of state trading, for example Veron Sorenson, argue that “the 
trading undertaken by the export tender system of the European Community 
constitutes a state trading enterprise”.
3 
The definition of an STE is a hotly debated subject. The definition is important 
because it determines which agencies must be notified to the WTO as STEs and be 
subject to WTO disciplines. The existing WTO definition is imprecise and depends to 
a large extent upon self-identification, by members, of their institutions/measures that 
they consider to be state controlled. As a result, many enterprises with state-
sanctioned powers are excluded from the WTO’s STE disciplines. Peter Lloyd 
provides an economic definition where “state trading occurs when there exists a 
trading organization for which the prices and/or quantities of international transactions 
in commodities are determined as an instrument in the pursuit of government 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy  177   J. Rude and M. Annand 
policies”. 
4 Given that this definition focuses on government control for public policy 
objectives, the system of European intervention purchases and export tendering is a 
strong candidate for STE notification. Although it is arguable that the entire system of 
EU cereals intervention fits an economic definition of state trading, does the system fit 
the legal definition? 
This paper argues that the EU cereals intervention system, taken as a whole, fits 
the legal definition of an STE, even though individual elements of the system, taken 
on their own, may not qualify as STEs.  
Three fundamental elements are identified in the WTO’s working definition of a 
state trading enterprise: a government or non-government entity; the granting of 
exclusive or special rights or privileges; and the resulting influence on the level or 
direction of imports or exports.
5 The objectives of this paper are to establish: that an 
entire intervention system can be considered as a single entity; that the type of 
relationship between the EU grains intervention system and the government includes 
the grant of an exclusive right; and that this system influences the level or direction of 
trade. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The second section examines alternative 
definitions of a state trading enterprise. The third section details the argument why the 
European system of cereals intervention and export tendering should be notified to the 
WTO as a state trading enterprise. The final section provides conclusions. A technical 
annex examines the operations of EU cereals intervention agencies and the system of 
export tendering, and describes the role of the major agents. 
 
Definition of a State Trading Enterprise 
The WTO rules on state trading contained within the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (1994) are primarily contained in Article XVII. The Article provides: 
1. (a) Each contracting party undertakes that if it establishes or maintains a 
State enterprise, wherever located, or grants to any enterprise, formally or 
in effect, exclusive or special privileges, such enterprise shall, in its 
purchases or sales involving either imports or exports, act in a manner 
consistent with the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment 
prescribed in this Agreement for governmental measures affecting imports 
or exports by private traders. 
(b) The provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph shall be 
understood to require that such enterprises shall, having due regard to the 
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other provisions of this Agreement, make any such purchases or sales 
solely in accordance with commercial considerations, including price, 
quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of 
purchase or sale, and shall afford the enterprises of the other contracting 
parties adequate opportunity, in accordance with customary business 
practice, to compete for participation in such purchases or sales. 
(c) No contracting party shall prevent any enterprise (whether or not an 
enterprise described in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph) under its 
jurisdiction from acting in accordance with the principles of subparagraphs 
(a) and (b) of this paragraph. 
  One of the major deficiencies of Article XVII is the absence of a clear 
definition of the term “state trading enterprise”. There is no formal definition of an 
STE in the GATT or any other WTO agreement, hence, the meaning of the term must 
be determined from the language and context of Article XVII. 
  The general reference in Article XVII: 1(a) distinguishes between two 
different types of enterprise: 
(a) a “state enterprise” or  
(b) “any enterprise” that has been granted “formally or in effect, exclusive 
or special privileges”. 
First, a “state enterprise” appears to mean any government-owned or government-
controlled enterprise regardless of whether it has been granted exclusive or special 
rights and privileges.
6
 Second, “any enterprise” that has being granted “formally or in 
effect, exclusive or special privileges” refers to enterprises having some special 
relationship with government. This second type of enterprise will also be an STE even 
it is not owned by government. The interpretive note to Article XVII specifically 
details that marketing boards that are established by governments and are engaged in 
purchasing or selling goods are subject to the provisions on state trading enterprises.
7 
Although several dispute panel reports
8
 under GATT 1947 have contained 
references to the meaning of state trading enterprise,
 
the definitional issue of what is 
an STE has not yet been specifically ruled on by any dispute settlement panel.
9 These 
panel reports make it clear that it is not only an “instrumentality of government” 
which is caught by Article XVII. State trading enterprises also include non-
governmental bodies that have been granted exclusive or special privileges. None of 
the panel reports, however, have dealt with state trading exporters, for they deal only 
with importers. As a result, there is no GATT jurisprudence specifically directed to the 
issue of the definition of a state trading exporter.
10  
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The 1960 GATT panel on Subsidies and State Trading narrowed the definition of 
an STE in two ways. First it established that not all functions of government, such as 
trade policy, can be considered to be state trading activities: 
[T]he Panel did  not use the word “enterprise” [in connection with the 
scope of the notification requirements] to mean any instrumentality of 
government. There would be nothing gained in extending the scope of the 
notification provisions of Article XVII to cover governmental measures 
that are covered by other articles of the General Agreement. The term 
“enterprise” was used to refer either to an instrumentality of government 
which has the power to buy or sell or to an non-governmental body with 
such power and to which the government has granted exclusive or special 
privileges. 
11 
Second it narrowed the government instrumentality to buying or selling and 
influencing trade:  
The term “enterprise” was used to refer either to an instrumentality of 
government which has the power to buy or sell, or to a non-governmental 
body with such power and which the government has granted exclusive or 
special privileges. The activities of a marketing board or any enterprise 
defined in paragraph 1(a) of Article XVII should be notified where that 
body has the ability to influence the level or direction of imports or exports 
by its buying or selling.
12 
The evolution of STE definitions culminated in paragraph 1 of the WTO 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of GATT 1994, which provides 
the following working definition for state trading enterprises: 
Governmental and non-governmental enterprises, including marketing 
boards, which have been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges, 
including statutory or constitutional powers, in the exercise of which they 
influence, through their purchases or sales, the level or direction of imports 
or exports. 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann argues that this definition is narrower than the definition 
in Article XVII: 1. The definition is narrower because state-owned enterprises are 
excluded unless they satisfy two conditions: (1) they have a special right or privilege 
and (2) they influence the level or direction of trade through sales or purchases.
13 This 
is a higher standard than the plain language of Article XVII, which does not require a 
trade influence. The working definition also switches the focus from an institutional 
definition to a functional definition because it focuses on the causal effect that special 
rights or privileges have on trade flows. The emphasis on function raises the question: 
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what are the boundaries of an enterprise? The more basic question remains – what is 
an enterprise? 
This latter question can be addressed using an interpretive approach used by 
recent dispute settlement panels. The Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO has now 
shed some light on how it will approach the interpretation of the language in GATT 
1994. The dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body have taken a consistent 
interpretive approach to applying the language of the WTO agreements. The approach 
starts with an examination of the plain meaning of the words of the agreement.
14
 The 
Dispute Settlement Body has used this approach by examining dictionary definitions 
of the words at issue.
15  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “enterprise” to mean: 
“an organization or venture, especially for business purposes” or “one or 
more persons or organizations that have related activities, unified 
operation or common control, and a common business purpose”.
16
 
The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary describes an enterprise as: 
“a piece of work taken in hand, an undertaking”.
17
 
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines “enterprise” as: 
“a project or undertaking that is especially difficult, complicated, or risky” 




It is clear from these definitions that the word “enterprise” extends beyond a legal 
entity such as a corporation. Rather, an enterprise can extend to an entire project made 
up of one or more organizations that have related activities and a common business 
purpose. An enterprise can therefore be a single entity or a group of organizations, 
including both government and non-governmental organizations.  
The Dispute Settlement Body has also applied an accepted set of legal interpretive 
principles to the interpretation of treaty language. The Dispute Settlement Body 
considers the text in which the word is found, the context for the term in the treaty or 
agreement, and the objects and purpose of the agreement. With regard to the text of 
Article XV11: 1(a), it should be noted that the term “enterprise” is used in both “state 
enterprise” and “any enterprise”. This supports the suggestion that “enterprise” should 
be broadly construed to include any combination of state-owned or state-controlled 
organizations and other types of organizations. The context of this term in Article 
XVII also supports a broad interpretation, in that the article is intended to place STEs 
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under the same rules as member states regarding GATT obligations (e.g., subsidies). A 
broad interpretation of “enterprise” to include a variety of complex organizations, 
schemes or projects would be supported by this context. 
Further, the objective of GATT is to liberalize trade and reduce trade distortions. 
This supports a broad definition of “enterprise”. It would be inconsistent with the 
purpose of GATT to allow member states to circumvent their trade obligations by 
creating enterprises that fall outside the definition. 
The application of these interpretive principles results in a meaning for the word 
“enterprise” as “one or more persons or organisations” that have “an organisation or 
venture, especially for business purposes” or “one or more persons or organisations 
that have related activities, unified operation or common control, and a common 
business purpose”. This definition of “enterprise” will be used in this paper in 
conjunction with the working definition of state trading enterprise provided by the 
WTO. 
The objective of this paper is to establish that the European cereals export system 
should be notified as an STE to the WTO. The definition that is used to establish this 
claim is the working definition of the WTO Understanding on the Interpretation of 
Article XVII. Although this is the narrowest definition of an STE, it is employed 
because it requires a higher standard than the plain wording of Article XVII, in that it 
requires an influence on trade flows. It also provides a functional definition. The 
boundaries of an “enterprise” are extended along functional lines by this working 
definition to include the system that controls the flow of cereal exports from the EU. 
The focus now shifts to the case for providing the WTO with notification of the EU 
cereals intervention and export tendering system as a State Trading Enterprise.  
Why the EU should provide notification: 
T 
hree fundamental elements are identified in the working definition of a state 
trading enterprise: (1) a governmental or non-governmental entity, (2) exclusive 
or special rights or privileges and (3) influence on the level or direction of trade. The 
premise of this paper is that the entire EU system of intervention purchases and export 
tenders constitutes a state trading enterprise; so the question is, does this system 
include these three elements? Specifically, can the intervention/export tender system 
be considered one enterprise in the context of Article XVII? Has the system been 
granted exclusive or special privileges and rights? Does the system influence the level 
or direction of trade? These questions are considered in turn. 
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Can a system be an enterprise? 
The dictionary definitions detailed above indicate that a group of organizations 
with related activities and a common purpose can constitute an enterprise. The 
workings of the EU cereals intervention system, how the parts of the system fit 
together, and the roles of the major players are described in the technical annex. The 
European Commission manages a significant undertaking in the control of all aspects 
of EU cereals markets. The various management committees are essential components 
of the Community machinery that contribute to the process of adopting and 
implementing the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy. The member state 
intervention agencies are the instruments that control the day to day functioning of 
cereals market intervention and help to implement the commercial export policy of the 
EU Commission. These organisations are all part of a single grain export enterprise 
ultimately answering to the political body of the Union’s Council of Ministers.  
The case for providing notification to the WTO of the EU system of cereals 
intervention and export tenders was made by the European Court of Auditors, which 
argues that through its “subsidised export of agricultural products, the Commission is 
in effect responsible for a commercial operation on an international scale.”
19 
Do the constituents of Europe’s grain export enterprise have 
exclusive or special rights or privileges? 
Numerous rights and privileges are shared among the three constituents of the 
intervention/ export tendering system. Since 1962, the Council of Ministers has 
entrusted the Commission with a growing volume of executive duties with respect to 
the Common Agricultural Policy and with ensuring that these duties are carried out in 
close collaboration with the member states. This collaboration is achieved by working 
with management committees on which member states are represented. 
The Council of Ministers has the exclusive right to determine the purchase and 
sale prices for domestic cereals. The Cereals Management Committee (CMC) has the 
right to provide opinions on market management measures. The member state 
intervention agencies have the exclusive right to undertake intervention purchases and 
sales. The intervention purchases are mandatory for cereals that meet certain quality 
standards. The money that member state intervention agencies receive for the 
purchase of grain ultimately comes from the European Guarantee and Guidance Fund 
(EAGGF). In addition, the intervention agencies have the right of payment from the 
EAGGF for entrance and exit storage fees, cost of transportation, and financing costs. 
Responsibility for storage of grain held in intervention is the sole responsibility of the 
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member state intervention agencies. The EU Commission has legal title to the product 
in intervention and bears the market risk of the product while it is in storage. 
The Cereals Management Committee is consulted on sales from intervention and 
on calls for tenders for the dispersal from intervention stocks; it also accepts the 
submitted bids for the tendering of stocks. The tendering process allows the 
Commission, and the system’s other constituents, to control the volume of trade. The 
open market tendering process has been described as a system where the Commission 
“buys the export services of traders”.
20 The Cereals Management Committee is the 
sole issuer of export licences. The member state intervention agencies are the chief 
administrators of these licences. 
These rights and privileges are exclusive to constituents of the EU system of 
cereals intervention and export tendering in that no other enterprise in the grain export 
trade has the same rights. These rights are special in the sense that they are granted by 
government and are different in nature from the rights or privileges otherwise enjoyed 
by private traders where there is no government intervention involved. 
Is the level or direction of exports influenced? 
Level 
This part of the definition requires that the quantity of product exported is 
increased or reduced by the STE from what would be the case without the 
involvement of the special right or privilege. A strict test of the “influence” on trade 
requires a factual comparison of trade with and without the intervention agency in 
place. Since this comparison is not possible, the influence on trade must be 
determined conceptually on the basis of the special rights and privileges offered. 
The European system of cereals intervention clearly can influence the level of 
trade. First, intervention prices that exceed those that would occur in an unfettered 
market will induce production and reduce consumption. Furthermore, compensatory 
payments can potentially induce higher levels of production and affect the allocation 
of area among crops. These instruments increase the size of the exportable surplus.  
In the absence of export subsidies, this exportable surplus could not be sold on 
international markets.
21 So the system of export tenders and refunds determines 
whether or not the EU will export grain. The level of trade is influenced by the size of 
the refunds that are determined by the tendering process. The procedure for setting the 
maximum refund in the open market tender is unclear (see the technical annex for 
details). Despite the existing “cross-check”, there is no definitive method by which the 
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refunds are determined. There appears to be significant leeway for the Commission to 
manipulate where the maximum refund should be set according to the tenders 
received, without any required justification. Similarly, for intervention tenders, the 
procedure for setting the minimum price is ambiguous. Despite the ambiguity in the 
method, the tender and refund system clearly influences the level of trade. 
Direction 
This part of the test examines whether the STE has an influence on the destination 
of exports. In other words, do the state trader rights influence where exports will go? 
While the private trader (tenderer for the restitution) decides where the product is to 
be exported, the Commission/Cereals Management Committee can affect the trader’s 
decision on the destination. It influences the direction of trade by adjusting the timing 
of the tendering process, stipulating that certain third countries are ineligible for 
restitution, directing trade through standing refunds, and influencing the direction of 
trade through the system of correctives (see the technical annex). 
The Commission/Cereals Management Committee is afforded even greater power 
in controlling the quantity and recipient of exported cereals by not being obligated to 
accept the minimum bid for the cereals in intervention. There are recorded instances 
when the Commission has chosen to pay a premium for some exports when they 
deemed the customer worthy or important or when they were trying to counteract the 
initiative of the U.S. Export Enhancement Program.
22 
The introduction of a “special one-day refund” in the standing refund procedure is 
questionable (see the technical annex). Set criteria that explain the circumstances 
allowing this type of procedure do not exist. The decision to use the procedure is a 
unilateral one taken by the Commission, demonstrating yet again its considerable 
control over both the quantity and destination of the traded product.  
Is the influence on the level or direction of exports a result 
of the rights or privileges? 
STEs that engage in commercial activity will be affected by many factors, 
including price, quality, demand considerations, market structure and other 
commercial considerations. The level and direction of exports are determined by these 
commercial factors. If the special rights or privileges, such as refunds from 
government, also influence the level or direction of exports, then the enterprise having 
the rights or privileges will fall within the definition of an STE. 
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In the circumstances of the European Commission and the CMC, the rights or 
privileges involved in the implementation of the intervention schemes allow the 
intervention system to influence the level or direction of exports. 
Is the influence exerted through sales by the enterprise? 
The functional definition set out above appears to require that sales be performed 
by the enterprise. The purchase of grain stocks by the member state intervention 
agencies at a fixed intervention price has an influence on eventual export of the grain. 
These purchases make a supply of grain available, through intervention stocks, to 
private traders to sell into the export market. The sales of this grain by the intervention 
agencies, as part of the enterprise established by the EU, directly influence the level 
and direction of exports. The sales by the intervention agencies result in sales of 
specific grain into specific markets at prices determined by the EU. This is precisely 
the type of behaviour that Article XVII is attempting to regulate. 
Conclusions 
T 
he European system of cereals intervention purchases and export restitution fits 
the definition of an STE exactly, when the definition of an enterprise is 
broadened to include all constituents of the system. At the heart of this system is the 
EU Commission, which determines the level of exports by setting intervention prices 
and refund rates. This system effectively gives the Commission a flexible means of 
managing the export market. The Commission has a decisive voice over such key 
parameters as the timing, quantity and destination of subsidised exports. The member 
state intervention agencies are the instruments that help implement the commercial 
export policy of the EU Commission. A wide array of special privileges, which result 
in influence over the level and direction of trade, are shared among the members of 
this system. The tendering process allows the Commission to control the volume and 
direction of trade. The treasuries of member countries deal with the financing of 
intervention purchases and export sales. The member state intervention agencies hold 
title to the product for part of its journey to the export market.  
The significance of the conclusion that the European cereals intervention system 
is a state trading enterprise is twofold. First, the EU should be providing a state 
trading notification to the WTO regarding its cereals intervention system. Such a 
notification would be consistent with its obligations under Article XVII of GATT 
1994. The EU should provide this notification if it expects to have any legitimacy in 
its arguments about the state trading activities of other WTO members. 
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Second, the fact that the European cereals intervention system is a state trading 
enterprise will have a significant influence on the next round of WTO negotiations. 
The acceptance by the EU of the working definition of state trading enterprise, and 
acceptance that the cereals intervention system fits this definition, would provide 
momentum for meaningful negotiations on export subsidies, state trading enterprises, 
and agricultural trade in general. 
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